One of John Dewey’s goals as a philosopher was to rescue his discipline from the epistemological deadlocks centered about the concept of essence, or as he might have put it, to disengage philosophy from its excessive concern with the fixed and the sure. In order to do this he stressed the contextual aspect of philosophical construction, and, so some claim, undercut belief in the existence of an a priori realm of essence determining activity. The purpose of this paper is to (...) point out that this is not the case. My procedure will be: to present Dewey’s understanding of the causes for the epistemological deadlocks in philosophy’s past; to present the implications of this understanding and its effect upon philosophical method; to present the metaphysical implications of the first two points. I hope to make it clear that Dewey recognized the existence of something prior to an experienced context which limited its possibilities and that there is validity to an inquiry into this something prior to an experienced context. To such he gave the name of metaphysics. (shrink)

The two insights which Wittgenstein’s assertion provides and which I wish to suggest can make a fruitful contribution toward understanding art are, first, the world of art is an imposed world, and, second, artistic activity is related intrinsically or essentially to the world it imposes. If the limits of the language which I use does mean the limits of the world which I know, that language must impose itself upon this world. If the language which I use imposes itself upon (...) my world this imposition must contribute to, or participate in, this world which I know because of it. That is, it cannot merely point to it, but actually must bring it about. It brings about what was not, and what could not be without it. Different languages must mean different impositions and different impositions must mean different worlds. It is because we have this language that we come to have this world, not before or after we use the language, but with and while we use it. The imposition is logical, not chronological. To assert that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world is to assert that language is not a coat or map which we make to fit some previously established limit but that it is an activity which is bound up with the development of these limits themselves. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's explication of Pindar's assertion that ‘to glorify was the essence of poetry’ puts it quite well. He tells us that for Pindar the word does not derive its force from what is already complete in itself. For then man would be glorifying what is already glorious, that which already has the power to impress men. At best the word then would denote an acknowledgment or a confession of being impressed. Instead, he insists, the word denotes the power of (...) making to appear, or to extol a place. 1. (shrink)